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Ownership of Electronic Rights and the Private International
Law of Copyright
by Jane C. Ginsburg·
When, in response to a French decision upholding the rights of employee
journalists to prevent the publisher's unauthorized licensing of electronic rights in the
journalists' articles; French newspaper publishers yearn for "American-style
copyright,"2 they must imagine a work-made-for-hire nirvana in which publishers
dispose of all rights in contributions to their periodicals, heedless of (and legally
shielded from) authors' pesty claims for payment or control. To the extent that the
work-made-for-hire doctrine applies, the publishing paradise conjured up by these
French fantasies of law "reform" is very real indeed. Under U.S. copyright law,
employee creators are not statutory "authors;" their employer enjoys that status, and
owns all rights in the copyright. ab initio.3 Thus, had they been U.S. employee
journalists challenging a U.S. employer-publisher's U.S. electronic exploitation, the
plaintiffs in the Dutch, Belgian and French cases would have had no claim. Even
U.S. free-lance journalists will be subject to copyright divestiture through the works
made-for-hire rule, if they sign a contract that commissions their contribution to the
periodical, and specifies that their contribution wm' be considered a work made for
hire.4 But, as the Tasinr case illustrates, not all free-lancers sign work for hire
agreements, either because they enjoy sufficient bargaining power to resist the
publisher's demands, or (at least equally likely) because publishers are not always
punctillious about securing these agreements.
Under U.S. copyright law, if the creator ofthe contribution is not an employee for
hire, then she is the author and copyright owner, and, Tasini tells us, in the absence
of a clear contractual grant, the author will not be presumed to have conveyed
anything more than initial print publication rights. The copyright act requires any
grant of exclusive rights to be in writing and signed by the author.6 Thus, if a free
lance author has merely contracted to publish in a print journal, she has not also
contracted to be republished in a digital medium.

•
Morton L Janklow Professor of Literary and Artistic Property Law, Columbia University
School ofLaw.
©1998Jane C. Ginsburg
I.
See Trib. Ode. Instance de Strasbourg, order of February 3, 1998, English translation infra,
in the appendix of this issue, 22 COWM.-VLAJ. L &ARTS 199 (1998).
2
See Yves-Marie Labe, La presse s'inte"oge sur les droits d'auteur lies aux medias
electroniques, LE MONDE, Feb. 6, 1998, at 20, col. I.
See 17 U.S.C. §§101, 20 l (b).
3.
See 17 U.S.C. §101(2)
4.
S
Tasini v. New York Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.N.Y.), reh'g denied, 981 F. Supp.
841 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
17 U.S.C. § 204(a). A grant of non exclusive rights, however, may be oral or inferred from
6.
conduct. See, e.g., Effects Associates v. Cohen, 908 F.2d SSS (9th Cir. 1990), cen. denied, 498 U.S.
1103 (1991).
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Were that the end of the U.S. copyright act's allocation of rights between authors
and publishers, American copyright might still seem a lush oasis, albeit not quite the
publishing paradise coveted abroad. Enter section 201(c) of the 1976 Copyright Act,
which awards the copyright owners of collective works a presumptive privilege to
reproduce the separately copyrighted works of its contributors, "as part of that
particular collective work, any revision of that collective work, and any later
collective work in the same series." Tasini tests the meaning both of the publisher's
"privilege," and of "revision of that collective work." Were the District Court's
ruling - that the publisher's revision privilege is transferrable to a third party
database whose economic utility is to permit searching individual articles across
myriad publishers' periodicals - to stand, then the U.S. would indeed appear a
publisher's haven in a storm of conflicting claims to new technology rights.
But copyright is territorial. 7 Since the result in Tasinirested on interpretation of
section 201(c), a provision peculiar to U.S. law, it is necessary to explore whether a
U.S. publisher could assert the "privilege" against its contributors in licensing
electronic rights for exploitation abroad. For example, the New York Times may now
be able to license the content of its daily issues to NEXIS for U.S. database users, but
may it also license the material to NEXIS to make available to French, Belgian or
Dutch database users? Is the answer the same whatever the employment status
(salaried journalist or freelancer) of the contributor? What of a foreign newspaper
publisher? May it license website or database rights for the U.S. without the consent
of its freelance journalists? May it dispose freely in the U.S. of all publication rights
(electronic or otherwise) in articles first published in Holland, Belgium or France by
employee journalists? Put another way, does the mantle of works made for hire (and
similar U.S.-law benefits or privileges) continue to drape the U.S. publisher wherever
it exploits an employee's work; may a foreign publisher from a country that does not
have a work made for hire regime assume that mantle for U.S. exploitations?
This comment will explore why the answer to the question regarding the
extraterritorial effect of section 201(c) should be "No, with respect to database or
website access in countries requiring that authors explicitly transfer electronic
republication rights, the U.S. publisher should not be able to license foreign electronic
rights without the freelance authors' consent." On the other hand, a U.S. employerfor-hire should retain copyright ownership even in countries where salaried authors
remain copyright holders. By the same token, a foreign employer-publisher who does
not own all rights at home does not suddenly acquire them for the U.S. simply by
licensing exploitations that enter U.S. borders.
1. STATUTORY "PRIVILEGES" AND COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP:
SOME PREOGATIVES ARE MORE TERRITORIAL THAN OTHERS
It may seem inconsistent at first blush to contend that, insofar as the works for hire
doctrine is concerned, the law of the work's country of origin (first publication)
determines copyright ownership for all countries in which the work may be

7.

See mH
PAUL GOLDSXEIN, COpYRirGr § 16.0, 16:1-2 (2d ed. 1996).
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exploited', but also to assert that U.S. publishers may not claim the benefits of the
section 201(c) revision privilege abroad. Nonetheless, the two propositions in fact
complement, rather than contradict, each other, in contrast to the works made for hire
regime, section 201(c) sets forth a "privilege;" its holder is not a copyright owner of
the contributions to the collective work.9 Section 201(c) establishes a narrow
accommodation for copyright holders of collective works, but preserves the separate
copyrights of the contributors. That provision neither makes copyright owners of
collective works the joint owners of the contributor's digital media rights, nor does
it purport to supplant the contributor's ownership of those rights. Moreover, section
201(c) operates in default of contracts. While courts abroad generally give effect to
copyright transfer contracts governed by a foreign law', it is less clear that they
would give supranational effect to a special statutory privilege, especially if its result
were to divest authors of rights for which publishers must bargain under local law.
If foreign jurisdictions decline to give supranational effect to section 201 (c), then
making U.S. free-lance journalists' articles available to a non-U.S. public through
NEXIS without the authors' consent would appear to violate many foreign copyright
laws. This suggests that NEXIS (and similar exploiters) would need either to seek
the authors' permission for many markets in Europe and elsewhere, or to block
access to subscribers from those countries.
But if section 201(c) is so territorially restricted that U.S. collective works
copyright owners may not extend its benefits beyond U.S. borders, does it also follow
that foreign collective works copyright owners may claim its benefits for the U.S.
market? Arguably, the principle of national treatment enshrined in the Berne
Convention" would assimilate foreign copyright owners to U.S. owners, and thus
would confer the section 201(c) privilege on foreign collective works copyright
owners. A closer look at both the Berne Convention and section 104 of the U.S.
Copyright Act, however, reveals that neither instrument applies the national treatment
principle to copyright ownership (much less to sub-ownership privileges). The Berne
Convention directs application of the law of the "country where protection is
claimed" to "the extent of protection as well as the means of redress afforded to the
author to protect his rights." '2 In other words, the treaty provides that the law of the
country where protection is claimed defines what rights are protected, the scope of
protection, and the available remedies; the treaty does not supply a choice of law rule

8.
See Jane C. Ginsburg and Pierre Sirinelli, Authors andExploiters in InternationalPrivate
Law: The FrenchSupreme Court and the Huston Fim Colorization Controversy, 15 COLUM.-VLA J. L
& ARTS 135 (1991); Jane C. Ginsburg, Conflits de lois et titulaire initialdu droit d'auteur, 18 CAHIERS
DU DROrr D'AUTEUR 1 (July-August 1989).

9.

See Alice Haenmerli, Commentary:. Tasini v. New York Times Co., in this issue, 22

CoLuM.-VLAJ.L & ARTs 129 (1998).
10.
See, e.g., EUGEN UIMER, INTELLECTAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

39 (1978). The result may be different if local law deems the object of the transfer a matter of substantive.
copyright law, rather than of contract interpretation, or considers that the transfer violates local public
policy. See discussion infra, pp. at 173-174.
11.
See Beine Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Paris Act of 1971,
reprinted in, S. TRE-ATY DOC. No. 27, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, art 5.2 (1986) [hereinafter Berne
Convention].
12.
Berne Convention, supra note 11, art. 5.2.
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for determining copyright ownership.' 3 Similarly, section 104 of the 1976 Copyright
Act prescribes the U.S. law protection of foreign works; it does not directly address
the application of U.S. law to foreign authors or rightsholders.
One might respond that if the Berne Convention and section 104 do not mandate
according foreign copyright owners all the rights or privileges that U.S. copyright
owners enjoy, neither do they prohibitfull assimilation of foreign copyright owners
to locals.1 4 To justify a choice of law rule that designates the law of the work's
country of origin over that of its countries of reception to govern copyright
ownership, it is necessary to consider why full territoriality is an undesirable solution.
II.TERRITORIALITY OF COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP AND ITS
ALTERNATIVES
Full territoriality does not in fact pervade the Bene Convention. That treaty
abandons or loosens the principle of territoriality with respect to a variety of
provisions that establish several supranational obligations or designate the application
of the law of the country of origin.' 5 Thus, if it is generally true that the Berne
Convention does not resolve the question of the law applicable to copyright
ownership, it is also true that the treaty as a whole does not support the radical
territoriality that would equate the law applicable to the scope of protection with that
applicable to the determination of ownership.
In the absence of a treaty choice of law rule, the issue is remitted to the choice of
law rules of the member countries. Potentially applicable conflicts rules of treaty
member nations may vary depending on the issue to be determined. For example,
local choice of law rules may identify one point of attachment for the law governing
initial copyright ownership, and another for transfers of ownership. With respect to
the law applicable to determine the initial allocation of copyright ownership when the
creators are employees, any of the following laws might be competent:
1.
The personal law (nationality or domicile) of the actual, human, creator(s);
2.
The personal law of the employer (nationality, domicile, principal place of
business -- if the employer is a corporate entity);
3.
The law governing the employment contract (if the contract effects a choice
of law; or the law of the country in which the contract is "localized");
4.
The law of the country of origin (first publication); or
5.
The law of the forum
a. Either as an adjuct to the forum law's competence to govern the
substantive question of infringement;
b. Or, as the law competent to govern the "condition/rights of foreigners";

13.
Except, Berne Convention, supra note 10, art. 14bis.2a: "Ownership of copyright in a
cinematographic work shall be a matter for legislation in the country where protection is claimed."
14.
But see 17 U.S.C. § 104A(b), discussed infra, text at 170-171.
15.
For supranational rules,
see, e.g., arts. 2.1, 2.3, 2.5, 2.6, 2bis.3, 5.2 al.1, 6bis. 1,6bis.2, 7.1,
7.3,7.4.2,7.5,8,9.1,9.2.2,9.3, 10.1, 10.3, 10bis.I al.2, 11,1lbis.l, 11bis.2.2, I Ibis.3.1, liter, 12, 14,
14bis. 1, 15.1, 15.2, 15.3, 16.1, 16.2. For application of the law of the country of origin, see, e.g., arts.
2.7.2, 7.8, 18.1.
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c. Or, as the generally residual choice of law designation
Concerning transfers of copyright ownership, potentially applicable choice of law
rules include:
The law chosen by the parties to the contract
1.
2.
The law of the country in which the contract can be localized
3.
The law of the forum
The adoption of a choice of law rule for copyright ownership should further an
overall goal of the Berne Convention, to promote the international dissemination of
works of authorship.' 6 Application of a rule of strict territoriality could result in a
multiplicity of laws governing copyright ownership; this might so disrupt international commerce in copyrighted works as to defeat one of the principal purposes of
Moreover, while it has long been recognized that "international
the treaty.'
copyright" is more accurately understood as a collection of national copyrights
conferred on the author (or initial copyright holder) by virtue of bi- and multilateral
treaties, "8that characterization better fits the determination of protectable subject
matter and scope of rights than ownership of rights. It makes more sense to conceive
of copyright as germinating in a work's source country, subsequently to flower in all
other countries in which the work is protected. The countries that later host the work
tend to its growth, but the welcome they extend to the work does not uproot it from
its source. The work's source country (country of first publication, or domicile or
nationality of the author if the work is unpublished) determines who is the initial
titleholder. Instead of seeking alternative points of attachment for identifying the law
competent to designate copyright ownership, "it is simpler and more just simply to
refer to the substantive rule as set forth in the national law under whose aegis the
work was born."' 9
Why is it "simpler and more just" to adopt the law of the country of origin to
govern initial copyright ownership? Because that choice of law rule ensures that the
work will not change owners by operation of law each time the work crosses an
international boundary. By the same token, licensees in all countries will know that
they have acquired rights from their owner. This does not mean that local law cannot
modify or even disrupt the ownership allocation established in the source country, for

16.

See, e.g., CLAUDE MASOUYE, GUIDE DE LA CONVENTION DE BERNE 5 (1978).

17.
Despite the intuitive appeal of this argument, the Berne Convention appears to tolerate the
disparities resulting from application of the forum's law to determination of at least some ownership issues,
see Berne Convention, supra note 10, art. l4bis.2a, on cinematographic works. On the other hand,
distinguished commentators consider this provision to be an aberration, see, HENRI DESBOIS, ANDRm
FRANON, ANDRE KtREVER, LES coNVENTIONS INTERNATIONALES DU DROIT D'AUTEUR ET DES DROITs

voisiNs 217 (1976).
See, e.g., Jon Baumgarten, Primer on the Principlesof InternationalCopyright, in FouRTH
18.
COPYRIGHT AND INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY
ANNUAL U.S. COPYRIGHr OFFIcE SPEAKS: CoNTE ORARYP
ISSUES 470, 471 (1992) (Prentice-Hall Law & Business): 'The term 'intemrnational copyright' is something
of a misnomer, for neither a single code governing copyright protection across national borders, nor a
unitary multi-national property right, exists. What does exist is a complex of copyright relationsamong
sovereign states, each having its own copryight law applicable to acts within its territory." (emphasis in

original).
19.
Judgment of April 29, 1970, Cass.civ. (Soc. Lancio v. Soc. Editirice Fotoromanzi
Internazionali), 1971 REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROrr INTERNATIONAL Piuvt 270, note H. Batiffol.
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example by applying the host country's public policy (ordre public) exception.
Nonetheless, in principle, resort to the law of the source country reinforces the
security of international contracts, and therefore would seem to promote the
international exchange of copyrighted works.
In the context of work for hire relationships, moreover, the source country will
often also correspond to at least one of the other points of attachment indicated above.
The country of first publication is usually also the country where the
employer/publisher has its principal place of business; it may also be the country of
residence or nationality of the employees. If one of these additional points of
attachment applies, the source country is likely to be the country in which the
employment contract is localized as well.

M. COMPETENCE OF THE SOURCE COUNTRY'S LAW TO GOVERN
COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP
A recent amendment to the U.S. Copyright Act adopts the "source country"
approach. Section 104A, added to implement U.S. obligations under the TRIPS
agreement', restores copyright protection in qualifying foreign works. Section
104A(b) provides:
Ownership of Restored Copyright. A restored work vests initially in the author
or initial rightholder
of the work as determined by the law of the source country
l 21
of the work.
Thus, in reinstating copyright protection for foreign works whose copyrights had been
lost, notably through noncompliance with U.S. formalities, U.S. courts and the
Copyright Office will look to the person or entity that the law of the treaty country of
first publication designates as the copyright holder. Where there is more than one
treaty country of first publication, the source country is the one with the "most
significant contacts with the work." In the case of employee-created or commissioned
works, that country will likely be the country in which the employment or

commissioned work contract is localized. That would mean, for example, that if the
copyright in a French collective work published before 1964, such as a magazine, and
its component articles and photographs, had lapsed through nonrenewal, the restored

20.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in
Counterfeit Goods, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex IC, Legal Instrument-Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 LL.M. 81 (1994).
21.

Section 104A(h)(8) defines the "source country" of a restored work as

(A) a nation other than the United States;

(B) in the case of an unpublished work (i) the eligible country in which the author or rightholder is a national or domiciliary, or, if a
restored work has more than 1 author or rightholder, the majority of foreign authors or
rightholders are nationals or domiciliaries of eligible countries; or
(ii)
if the majority of authors or rightholders are not foreign, the nation other than the United
States which has the most significant contacts with the work; and
(C) in the case of a published work -(i) the eligible country in which the work is first published, or
(ii) if the restored work is published on the same day in 2 or more eligible countries, the eligible
country with the most significant contacts with the work.
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copyright in the collective work would belong to the publisher, and the copyrights in
the articles and photographs would belong to their individual authors and photogra-

phers. The latter is true whether or not the contributors were the employees of the
publisher, because French law does not have a works made for hire doctrine.22

In the absence of further indication in the text of the Copyright Act concerning
attribution of initial copyright ownership in foreign works, does section 104A(b)
simply affirm the general approach of U.S. copyright conflicts analysis, or should one
interpret the specificity of section 104A(b) as a departure from a territorial norm? A
1997 decision from the Southern District of New York, Itar-Tass Russian News
Agency v. Russian Kurier,Inc.,23 suggests that 104A reflects a broader understanding
of the law governing ownership claims. In Itar-Tass, plaintiffs, Russian and Israeli
newspaper publishers and a Russian news agency, sought relief against the "open and
blatant copying of copyrighted articles" by the defendant New York-based Russian
language newspaper. The defendant did not deny that it had indeed copied the
articles, but asserted that the plaintiffs had no "protectable copyright interest in the
articles taken from their publications."24 In addressing whether or not plaintiffs were
copyright owners, the court did not consider whether, had the Russian and Israeli
publishers been American, they would have been employers for hire.' Rather the
court undertook an extensive analysis of Russian copyright law relating to employers
generally, and to newspapers specifically, as well as of Israeli copyright law regarding
works created pursuant to employment, in order to determine whether, in the
countries of origin, plaintiffs would have been copyright owners of the rights
plaintiffs alleged were infringed in the U.S. Specifically, the court considered the
Russian law pertaining to the respective rights of copyright holders of periodicals,
and of the authors of works included in the periodicals. The defendant had alleged
that because, under Russian law, the authors retained exclusive rights in their

22.
See Code de Propri6te Intellectuelle [C.P.L] art. L. I1!-1.3 (FT.) ("the existence or conclusion
of a contract ordering the work does not in any way derogate from the author's enjoyment of the rights
recognized [above]").
23.
42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1810 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
24.
Id. at 1815.
By contrast, the court upheld plaintiffs' registrations of the newspapers with the U.S. Copyright
25.
Office as works made for hire. Defendant had contended that, in Russia, newspaper articles are not works
made for hire. The court replied: "This argument is misplaced because the plaintiffs registered their
copyrights under United States law, not Russian law. In registering the works, the concept of a 'work
made for hire' set by United States law was the most appropriate item to be listed." The court's territorial
notion of registration would be more troublesome if it clashed with the allocation of rights in the source
country. Under the court's analysis of that issue, however, some of the plaintiffs' rights were equivalent
to those of employers for hire; others of the plaintiffs did not own full rights in the contributions to the
periodicals, but did control all rights in the periodicals as a whole. More importantly, the court did not
conflate registration and ownership. The court appears to have sought the closest U.S. equivalent
regstration category corresponding to the nature of the work and the respective rights of the authors and
publishers; it did not, however, then apply that U.S.-law categorization back to its analysis of what rights
the plaintiffs owned in the source countries, Russia and Israel. CompareDae Han Video Productions Inc.
v. Kuk Dong Oriental Food, Inc., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1294 (D. Md. 1990), discussed infra (equating
registration with ownership).
The Copyright Office has accepted applications from foreign claimants who characterize the work as
"for hire," without requiring the applicant to demonstrate that in the source country the work would be "for
hire." Interview with David Carson, Esq., General Counsel, U.S. Copyright Office, Feb. 24,1998.
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separate contributions, thes publishers had no claim against the defendant's
republication of individual articles.' After evaluating expert testimony on the
relevant provisions of the Russian copyright law, the court ruled that, notwithstanding
the authors' separate fights, the newspapers also had a property fight in the articles,
amounting at least to "a sufficient interest in those articles to sue for a copyright
violation."'27 Because plaintiffs were the owners, in the source countries, of the rights
plaintiffs claimed were infringed in the U.S., the court concluded, plaintiffs did have
enforceable rights in the U.S.
By contrast, in Dae Han Video ProductionsInc v. Kuk Dong Oriental Food,
Inc.,28 the court applied U.S.-law work for hire criteria to an alleged Korean
employment relationship. The defendant, a third-party infringer, challenged the
application of U.S. law, contending that under Korean law, the scriptwriters were not
employees of the television producer and therefore retained the copyrights. The court
followed a strictly, not to say woodenly, territorial approach to copyright ownership.
Its analysis of the issue was as follows:
[T]he court in this case is dealing with copyright certificates issued by the
United States Copyright Office. It is therefore the federal Copyright Act which
is controlling and not any provision of Korean copyright law. ... Korean law
is not pertinent to the Court's determination that the scripts are works for hire
because the screenwriters are employees of the networks. [The court had
already applied U.S.-law criteria to determine that the screenwriters were
"employees" for hirej .29
It is understandable that U.S. courts would reject defenses "championing" author's
rights against their publishers, when crediting the "pro-author" argument would result
in dismissing the publisher's claims against blatant infringers, as was the case in Dae
Han. As in Itar-Tass, there is no evidence that the Dae Han defendants' solicitude
for authors' rights led them to secure licenses from the authors. Dae Han therefore
may not offer much guidance concerning the law to apply to copyright ownership
claims when the controversy pits authors against publishers, rather than publishers
against pirates.
Itar-Tass supports the proposition that, were a foreign author to challenge her
employer/publisher's grant to a U.S. licensee of rights that, the author asserts, the
publisher does not enjoy in the source country, a U.S. court should not simply equate
employer status with ownership of all rights (as would be the case if U.S. law
applied). Rather, the court should look to the source country to ascertain if that law

26.
42 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1815. The defendant had not, however, obtained permission from the
individual authors, either.
The court did not need to determine whether the publisher would still have a property interest
27.
in individual articles were its claim not against a third-party infringer, but against an author who licensed
rights in the separate contributions.
28.
19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1294.
29.
Id. at 1298.
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accords publishers prerogatives akin to a works for hire regime. 3° If the source
country's law does not effect a general transfer to the employer, the U.S. court should
next inquire if a specific statutory provision allocates the particular rights that the
publisher is claiming. In the absence of a statutory grant, the court should determine
if the foreign publisher/employer acquired by contract from the author the rights it
purports to exercise in the U.S. or to grant to a U.S. licensee. The law of the contract
(law chosen by the parties, or law ascertained by "localizing" the contract) would
determine the formal requirements for the contract, for example, whether the contract
must be in writing and signed by the author, and the degree of specificity with which
the rights granted must be listed. Thus, if foreign authors from a "purpose of the
grant" jurisdiction3 who had written for print publications were contesting the
foreign publisher's (or its U.S. licensee's) U.S. exploitation of electronic database
rights, the U.S. court should look to the law of the foreign contract to determine if
database rights should be deemed included.
IV. TRANSFERS OF COPYRIGHT, AND THE ROLE OF LOCAL COPYRIGHT PUBLIC POLICY
If the law of the contract normally is competent to determine who is the copyright
holder for the source country and abroad, the host country may nonetheless interpose
its law when, under the law of the host country, the rules governing the contractual
grant of rights at issue are considered a matter of substantive copyright law, rather
than of interpretation of contracts, and/or the result of applying the foreign law would
conflict with strongly held local public policy (ordrepublic). In other words, while
the law of the source country governs what an author may grant,the law of the host
country may also determine what the grantee may receive in that jurisdiction. The
host country's law may prohibit the transfer of certain kinds of rights. For example,
in Germany, a contract may not grant rights in new modes of exploitation unknown
at the time of contracting.32 and in France, moral rights are inalienable?' The French
courts have rejected claims by a U.S. motion picture producer that its employer-forhire status and the film director's contractual waiver of moral rights should bar the
director's invocation in France of the moral right of integrity against the French

30.
The caselaw abroad, in at least one European Union jurisdiction, France, also appears to favor
the competence of the law of the source country to designate initial owership. See, e.g, Judgment of March
14, 1991 (Cofrad et La Rosa v. Almax), Cour d'Appel de Paris, 1992 J.C.P. I, No. 21781 (Fr.); Judgment
of Sept. 21, 1983 (Apple v. Segimex), Trib. Inst. (Fr.) 118 RIDA 259 (1983). But see, JACQUES
RAYNARD, DRorr D'AUTEUR Er CONFITr DE Lois: ESSA SuIt LA NATURE JURIDIQUE Du DRorr D'AUTEUR

§ 537 (1991) (advocating application of the law of the host country to determine initial copyright
ownership).
31.
See P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Electronic Rights and Wrongs in Germany and the Netherlands on
"purpose of the grant" principle of interpretation of copyright contracts, in this issue, 22 COLuM.-VLA J.L
& ARTS 151 (1998).
32.
See German Copyright Act of September 9, 1965 [Urheberrechtsgesetz] (published in
Bundesgesetzblatt, L p. 1273, No. 51, of September 16, 1965), with an English translation published in
I COPYRIGHT 251 (1965) discussed in Hugenholtz, supra note 31.
33.
See France, Code de la propri6t6 intellectuelle, art. L 121-1(3).
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broadcast of a colorized version of the film.' On the other hand, French courts have
also rejected a right of attribution claim by a French author bound by a U.S.-law
ghostwriter contract when the book under contention was written in the U.S. and
distibuted in several countries, including the U.S., and the contract specified the
application of U.S. law. 5
In other instances, the host country's law may prescribe the form required for an
effective grant. For example, in Corcovado Music Corp. v. Hollis Music, Inc.,36 a
Brazilian-law contract between a Brazilian composer and a Brazilian publisher
granted worldwide rights under copyright. The composer nonetheless terminated the
Brazilian publisher's U.S. rights at the conclusion of the first term of 1909 Act
copyright,37 and granted the U.S. renewal term rights to a U.S. publisher. The
Brazilian publisher objected that Brazilian law governed the grant of rights, and that
under Brazilian law, the composer had no rights left to grant to another publisher.
The Second Circuit held that, as a matter of U.S. copyright law, a contract granting
the U.S. renewal term must expicitly state that the contract covers renewals or
extensions of copyright. Because the Brazilian contract did not contain that language,
it was ineffective to transfer rights in the U.S. renewal term.
Returning to the Tasini problem, the principles just rehearsed reinforce the
conclusion that many foreign jurisdictions may decline to give effect to the section
201(c) privilege (as interpreted by the Southern District of New York). If these
jurisdictions would limit what a foreign grantee (or its local licensee) has received,
even when the grantee has bargained for the transfer in the source country, it seems
all the more unlikely that those host country jurisdictions would credit a more
expansive exercise of rights than local law would allow when the publisher has not
bargained for the rights, but has simply received them by operation of a source
country "privilege."
CONCLUSION
The principle of territoriality of copyright is, or should be, substantially attenuated
in matters of copyright ownership, both initial and by transfer. As a general
proposition, constancy of copyright ownership across international borders will
promote international trade in copyrighted works, particularly in an era of instant, and
pervasive, digital communications. But, the goal of reducing friction in the crossborder movement of works of authorship should not overwhelm the primary objective
of international copyright, as set forth in the Berne Convention, which is "to protect,
in as effective and uniform a manner as possible, the rights of authorsin their literary

34.
Judgment of December 19, 1994 (Turner En. v. Huston), Cour d'Appel de Versailles,
combined civil chambers, 164 RIDA 389 (1995) (Fr.). See also Judgment of May 30, 1984 (Marius
Constant v. Ste. Warner Bros.), Trib. Grde. Instance de Paris, 122 RIDA 220 (1984) (Fr.) (upholding
French film composer's attribution right in U.S. film when the film was distributed in France).
Judgment of Februsry 1, 1989 (Bragance v. de Chfce) Court of Appeals of Paris, 142 RIDA
35.
301,397 (1989), note by Sirinelli.
981 F.2d 679 (2d Cir. 1993).
36.
See 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (copyrights in first term subsisting on effective date of 1976
37.
Copyright Act).
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and artistic works." Uniformity in choice of law approaches to copyright ownership
should not lead to less effective protection of the rights of authors. Just as wooden
application of the copyright ownership law of the host country may needessly disrupt
the international dissemination of copyrighted works, so unflinching resort to the law
of the source country could promote the development - through manipulation of the
points of attachment to the "source" -- of a new kind of "copyright haven,"39 a
paradise not for pirates, but for some publishers.
Thus, while the starting point for analysis of the choice of law governing copyright
ownership should be the law of the source country (or of the contract), nonetheless
where the host country's legislation or case law expresses a strongly author-protective
public policy, it is likely that the host country will decline to give effect to the
otherwise applicable law. This means, for example, that the host country that seeks
to protect authors against improvident grants might recognize the transfer of fewer
rights than the author conveyed under the law of the source country.' ° By contrast,
host country courts should look to the law of the source country in order to ensure
that application of the host country's law will not result in giving the transferee more
rights than the author could convey in the source country.

38.
Berne Convention, supra note 11, preamble cl.
I (emphasis added). This fundamental goal
of the Berne Convention suggests that, where the treaty does not supply a choice of law rule, but leaves
the determination of applicable law to the member countries, those countries' determinations should be
guided by the principle of favor auctoris: when in doubt, follow the conflicts analysis that will yield an
author-favorable outcome.
39.
The term has been employed by the European Commission to refer to countries whose lax

copyright laws invite pirates to locate their operations in those countries, European Commission, Proposal
for a Council Directive Concerning Cable and Satellite Transmissions, Explanatory Memorandum,
COM(91) 276 Final, at 4.
40.

The intensity of the host country's public policy may vary. A host country may be highly

protective of its own authors, and more forgiving toward foreign author-grantee arrangements which, had
they been domestic contracts, would have been held invalid. See e.g., HENRI BATIFOL, TRArM DE DRorr
INTERNATIONAL PRIvE V.1 580 (1993) (on the difference between "ordre public," and "ordre public

international,"and the "effet attenu6 d'ordre public").

